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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A REALISTIC LOOK AT THE VICE PRESIDENCY: WHY DICK
CHENEY IS AN “ENTITY WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH”

INTRODUCTION
Few would argue that the office of the Vice President has remained
stagnant over the course of American history. What began as a weak
institution whose primary duty was to preside over the Senate1 has blossomed
into a position of international reach and influence.2 The office owes its
success not only to the men who have occupied the post, but also to the
Presidents who have advanced its role in government. It has been with the
permission and cooperation of their Presidents that the Vice Presidents of
today participate in “some of the most important decisions for the country’s
policies.”3
But despite the office’s close connection to the Commander in Chief, Vice
President Richard B. Cheney has declared that the office is “not . . . an entity
within the executive branch,” and therefore not subject to executive orders.4
Instead, his advisors argue that since he is the President of the Senate, he is
also a part of the Legislature.5 The statement was attacked by news
columnists,6 lambasted by internet bloggers,7 and ridiculed by late night

1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4; see also infra text accompanying notes 62, 67–68.
2. Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 812 (2005).
3. 110 CONG. REC. S8277 (daily ed. June 22, 2007) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
4. Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir. of the Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives
and Records Admin., to David S. Addington, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the
Vice President (June 8, 2006), available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200706210
95027.pdf.
5. See Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2007, at A1.
6. See, e.g., Maureen Dowd, Op-Ed., A Vice President Without Borders, Bordering on
Lunacy, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, § 4, at 15 (“[I]t’s quite a leap to go from hiding in a secure,
undisclosed location in the capital to hiding in a secure, undisclosed location in the
Constitution.”); Frank Rich, Op-Ed., When the Vice President Does It, that Means It’s Not Illegal,
N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 4, at 12.
7. See, e.g., Steven Taylor, The Office of the Vice President Does Not Consider Itself an
“Entity Within the Executive Branch,” on PoliBlog, http://www.poliblogger.com/?p=12133 (June
21, 2007) (“The assertion that the veep’s office is not part of the executive branch is perhaps the
most absurd thing that I have heard in some time.”). Others even believed that Cheney’s
statement was evidence that he committed fraud. See Posting of Mitchell W. Berger & Gregory
A. Haile to ACSBlog, Guest Blogger: Cheney’s Claims Could Expose Him to Suit,
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comedians.8 Senator Dick Durbin declared, “It is hard to imagine the tortured
logic Vice President Cheney is using to avoid the requirements of the law and
Executive orders.”9
What makes Cheney’s statement seem so absurd to so many people? After
all, some of the nation’s Founding Fathers, including Thomas Jefferson and
John Adams, considered the office to be “constitutionally confined to
legislative functions.”10 Aside from being the President’s successor, the
Constitution gives the Vice President only one official role: to preside over the
Senate where he can cast the tie-breaking vote during deadlocks.11
Furthermore, the Framers deliberately placed this duty in Article I with the
Legislature, not in Article II with the Executive.12 Clearly they believed that
the Vice President’s constitutional duties belonged to the Senate and the
Legislative Branch.13 One might therefore contend that Cheney’s statement
has substance within the framework of the Constitution and the intentions of its
drafters.
During the twentieth century, however, “the vice presidency . . . evolved
into a position of new importance.”14 Cheney in particular has been called the
most powerful Vice President in the nation’s history.15 His influence in the
Bush Administration touches everything from energy concerns and foreign
policy to editing tax proposals and refereeing cabinet disputes.16 In response to
Cheney’s claim that he is not part of the Executive Branch and therefore not
bound by executive orders, White House press spokeswoman Dana Perino
commented, “This is an interesting constitutional question that legal scholars

http://www.acsblog.org/separation-of-powers-guest-blogger-cheneys-claims-could-expose-himto-suit.html (July 5, 2007, 12:53 EST) (“[I]f he continued to maintain his position [Cheney] may
have committed a fraud . . . when he asserted that he was a member of the Executive Branch.”).
8. See, e.g., The Daily Show with Jon Stewart (Comedy Central television broadcast June
22, 2007).
9. 110 CONG. REC. S8277 (daily ed. June 21, 2007) (statement of Sen. Durbin).
10. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 119, 120 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1896).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
12. Id.
13. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
505, 515 (1995).
14. JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 13 (1982).
15. See Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: A Strong Push
from Backstage, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter A Strong Push]; Nightline:
Cheney Wields Unprecedented V.P. Power (ABC television broadcast Nov. 29, 2003)
(“[Cheney’s] power is unparalleled in the history of the republic, frankly, for that position.”
(statement of John Hulsman, research fellow at The Heritage Foundation)).
16. See A Strong Push, supra note 15.
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can debate.” White House Press Secretary Tony Snow also stated, “It is a
wonderful academic question. . . .”17
But it is dangerous to trivialize Cheney’s statement as an academic
exercise among legal scholars.18 His actions tread on one of the Constitution’s
most sacred principles—the separation of powers.19 “Congress has a
responsibility under the Constitution to conduct oversight of the executive
branch.”20 In a letter to the Vice President, Representative Henry Waxman
called Cheney’s decision to exempt his office from the Executive Branch
“problematic because it could place national security secrets at risk.”21 The
concern for Cheney’s statement, therefore, is not limited to the obscure realm
of constitutional academia. Rather, it is a concern for all Americans who have
witnessed the government’s response to national security, environmental
issues, the energy crisis, and economic recession.
This Comment does not propose amendments to the Constitution or try to
fix an office that has been criticized as “fundamentally flawed.”22 Instead, this
Comment attempts to answer a more basic question: To which branch of
government does Vice President Cheney belong? I argue that although the
office began as a Constitutional anomaly, located somewhere between both the
Legislative and Executive Branches, it has gradually migrated into the latter.
Part I discusses the historical context of the office and the Founding Fathers’
original intentions. Part II examines the changing view of the office,
particularly during the twentieth century when Presidents began to give their
Vice Presidents more executive duties. I argue that the Twenty-Fifth
17. AM: Cheney ‘A Law unto Himself’ (Australian Broadcasting Corp. radio broadcast June
27, 2007), available at http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2007/s1963294.htm.
18. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 9 (“Such indifference among scholars may once have
been appropriate. It no longer is. Compelling arguments justify a detailed consideration of the
vice presidency.”).
19. See SAUL K. PADOVER, TO SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 333 (1962) (“If it be essential to
the preservation of liberty that the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers be separate, it is
essential to a maintenance of the separation that they should be independent of each other.”
(attributing the comment to James Madison)).
20. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Administration Oversight,
http://oversight.house.gov/investigations.asp?ID=101 (last visited Dec. 15, 2008).
21. Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform,
to Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President (June 21, 2007), available at http://oversight.house.gov/
documents/20070621093952.pdf.
22. Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1703, 1705 (1988). Friedman identifies “three basic problems with the vice-presidency: the
method of nomination, the method of election, and the office itself.” Id. at 1703. Friedman then
proposes three solutions: that the Vice President hold another office of significance within the
Executive Branch, that the Vice President be separately nominated, and that the Vice President be
separately elected. Id. at 1705. For a counterargument, see Goldstein, supra note 13, at 549–59,
arguing that Friedman’s proposals are “fundamentally at odds with the vision behind the Twentyfifth Amendment.”
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Amendment’s realistic approach not only envisioned a stronger Vice President,
but also one firmly rooted within the Executive Branch.23 Finally, Part III
applies these lessons to Cheney’s Vice Presidency. This Comment concludes
by critiquing Cheney’s statement as a futile attempt to remove himself
nominally from the branch in which he is realistically entrenched both by his
activism in the White House and by the Constitution.
I. THE ORIGINAL VICE PRESIDENCY
“[U]nder the Constitution, I have legislative responsibilities. I’m actually paid
by the Senate, not by the Executive. I sit as the President of the Senate, as the
24
presiding officer in the Senate. I cast tie-breaking votes in the Senate.”

At its heart, Cheney’s argument is based upon an understanding that the
Framers of the Constitution intended the office of the Vice President to be
situated in the Legislative Branch of government. The strength of this
argument necessarily relies upon the belief that the Constitution should be
interpreted according to what the document meant to the generation that
originally drafted and ratified it.25
A.

Framers’ Original Intent

The Founding Fathers did not want the office of the Vice President.26
Even in his defense of the institution, Alexander Hamilton begins by admitting
that the Vice Presidency was “objected to as superfluous, if not
mischievous.”27 Why then was it created? The most obvious purpose of the
Vice President was to provide a “substitute for the president,” since there
needed to be some line of succession should the President be unable to fulfill

23. See generally Goldstein, supra note 13, at 523–40 (demonstrating the growth of the Vice
Presidency and the differences between what the Founding Fathers and the Framers of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment envisioned for the office).
24. CBS Radio News: VP Dick Cheney on Gonzales, Libby, Iraq (CBS radio broadcast July
30, 2007) [hereinafter Cheney Interview], available at http://audio.cbsnews.com/2007/07/30/
audio3113288.mp3 (statement of Richard Cheney); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (“The
Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote,
unless they be equally divided.”).
25. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L. REV. 535,
542 (1999). Originalists would argue that the purpose of the Constitution is to prevent change.
See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 40
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
26. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to Hugh Williamson).
27. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 347 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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his duties.28 But there were other ways to choose a successor to the
President.29
Professor Joel Goldstein suggests that the office provided both a means of
presidential succession and a solution to presidential elections.30 Early in the
debates, it was agreed that the President would be chosen by special electors
from each state.31 Each elector was to vote “for two Persons, of whom one at
least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves.”32 The
person with the most votes would become President, and the runner-up would
be the Vice President.33 The Framers feared that unless their second votes had
some significance, electors would strategically throw one of their votes so that
a candidate from their home state would prevail.34 Thus, the Vice President
“was introduced merely for the sake of a valuable mode of election which
required two to be chosen at the same time.”35
The delegates did not discuss the function of the Vice President until the
closing days of the Convention.36 Even then, little was apparently said.37
Nonetheless, their silence may speak volumes about their intentions for the
office. Early in the debates, it was agreed that executive power would be
vested in a single President.38 Giving the “next highest after the President”39
28. Id.
29. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 4 (noting that there were suggestions at the
Constitutional Convention to have the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court become the successor
to the President).
30. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512.
31. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 351–52.
32. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
33. Joel K. Goldstein, An Overview of the Vice-Presidency, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 786, 789
(1977).
34. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512; see also PADOVER, supra note 19, at 359 (“The
only objection which occurred was that each citizen, after having given his vote for his favorite
fellow-citizen, would throw away his second on some obscure citizen of another state in order to
ensure the object of his first choice.” (attributing the comment to James Madison)). Some
delegates, however, believed that the partiality of each state for their own favorite son served a
useful purpose. JULES WITCOVER, FROM ADAMS AND JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUALYE:
CRAPSHOOT—ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 15 (1992) (“Let the people of each
State choose its best Citizen.” (quoting John Dickinson)).
35. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to Hugh Williamson).
36. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 789 (noting that the “[c]reation of the Vice-Presidency was
an afterthought”).
37. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 510.
38. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 330–31 (indicating that the idea of a single Executive
was approved at the Convention on June 4, 1787). A single President was not appealing to all of
the delegates. See id. at 327–31. Edmund Randolph vigorously argued for three executives,
regarding unity as “the foetus of monarchy.” Id. at 328. This lingering threat of a monarchy
loomed in the hearts of some of the delegates while they discussed the role of a Vice President.
See id. at 392 (noting that George Mason “was averse to vest so dangerous a power in the
President alone”).
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any official role in the Executive Branch, therefore, might have threatened the
concept of unity. The Vice President was to be the runner-up of a competitive
election, and there would naturally be some animosity between two of the
nation’s most prominent leaders.40 If too much power was shared within the
Executive Branch, “the most bitter dissentions [would be] apt to spring,” which
would “lessen the respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans
and operations of those whom they divide.”41 Thus, the delegates’ silence
regarding the role of the Vice President in the Executive Branch indicates their
caution in giving the office too much constitutional authority.
This is not to say that the Framers wanted the Vice President removed
entirely from view. After all, he naturally carried a “weighty role” as the
potential successor to the President.42 They thought it necessary then to give
him “at least one official function.”43 In a vote of eight to two the delegates
finally agreed that the Vice President would be, ex officio, the President of the
Senate.44 This was a relatively meaningless position, which even the Framers
knew would be a “no-show job.”45 Although the role appeared largely
inconsequential, it conveniently solved one dilemma facing the delegates.
Because there were an even number of senators, it was necessary for there to
be a president of the assembly to cast a tie-breaking vote during deadlock.46
Removing one state’s senator in order that he may be the presiding officer
would weaken that state’s representation; therefore, it was necessary to bring
in someone else.47
Nonetheless, the Vice President’s role in the Senate created controversy.48
One of the greatest concerns confronting the Founding Fathers was to preserve
the fundamental principle of separation of powers that they had worked so hard
to promote.49 By its nature, some believed that the office of the Vice President
would be “an encroachment on the rights of the Senate” that would “mix[] too

39. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 576
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1840).
40. See Goldstein, supra note 13, at 516.
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 27, at 357.
42. Albert, supra note 2, at 820.
43. Id. at 821.
44. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391–92.
45. Friedman, supra note 22, at 1707–08; see Goldstein, supra note 13, at 512 (“This role
seems at most an incidental benefit of the office, a ready chore so the Vice President could earn
his keep.”).
46. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347.
47. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (“[S]ome member by being made President must be
deprived of his vote . . . .” (attributing the comment to Roger Sherman)); see THE FEDERALIST
NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347.
48. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391–92.
49. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 515.
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much the legislative and the executive.”50 Moreover, the anti-Federalists of the
group feared that the Executive Branch would be too strong and might
overpower the Legislature through the Vice Presidency.51 One delegate
quipped, “We might as well put the President himself at the head of the
legislature.”52 This suggests that these delegates believed the office was
rightfully an executive position being forced upon the Legislature.
The fruit of the deliberations at the 1787 Constitutional Convention was an
institution whose purposes were rooted in the Executive Branch, but whose
duties were legislative. The Vice President was therefore situated in both
branches, but welcome at neither address.53 The Founders’ reservations
toward creating the office no doubt resulted in a weak institution riddled with
ambiguity.54 It is not surprising, then, that problems soon arose.
B.

Problems that Arose with the Vice Presidency
1.

Impotence of the Office

The office of the Vice President was initially filled by very capable
leaders.55 John Adams and Thomas Jefferson, both of whom would later
become Presidents, were the first two to fill the spot.56 It was no accident. The
Founders carefully considered the qualifications for the second in line as they
debated the method for choosing the Chief Executive. In the Federalist Papers,
Hamilton wrote, “[A]ll the reasons, which recommend the mode of election
prescribed for the one, apply with great, if not with equal, force to the manner
of appointing the other.”57 But the first Vice Presidents approached the office
with reluctance and hesitation, realizing that their actions would have a
profound impact on the operations of the office well into the future.58
Adams was particularly wary of intruding upon the President’s executive
authority.59 He attended few cabinet meetings and advised the President only
upon occasion.60 Consequently, his influence in Washington’s Administration
was limited more to the Executive Branch’s ceremonial undertakings than

50. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 392 (attributing the comment to George Mason IV).
51. Albert, supra note 2, at 825.
52. PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391 (attributing the comment to Elbridge Gerry).
53. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 508.
54. Id. at 518.
55. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6.
56. Id.
57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 27, at 347.
58. See MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–1993, at 17
(Wendy Wolff ed., 1997).
59. Id. at 6–7.
60. Id. at 6.
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policy determinations.61 Instead, Adams focused on his role as President of the
Senate, stating that the Vice President was “totally detached from the executive
authority and confined to the legislative.”62 In his capacity as President of the
Senate, Adams cast twenty-nine tie-breaking votes, far more than any Vice
President since.63 Yet, even as head of the Legislature, Adams was frustrated
by the limitations of his office.64 The task of presiding rather than debating
was not quite adapted to his character.65 “[M]y country has in its wisdom
contrived for me,” he stated, “the most insignificant office that ever the
invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived. And as I can do
neither good nor evil, I must be borne away by others, and meet the common
fate.”66
Jefferson, too, realized the impotence of the Vice Presidency. Having
fundamentally different views from Adams, who had defeated him in the 1796
election, Jefferson was not interested in being the Chief Executive’s assistant.67
Instead, Jefferson confined his role in government to that of President of the
Senate, where he promised to approach his duties “with more confidence” than
his predecessor.68 Nonetheless, Jefferson could not stop Adams and the
Federalists from pushing through legislation that Jefferson believed violated
the Constitution.69 When he called for the states themselves to nullify the
federal laws, Jefferson was only able to muster support from the legislatures of
his home state Virginia and neighboring Kentucky, both of which modified
what they believed to be his rather extreme rhetoric.70
The point of illustrating the first two Vice Presidencies here is not to
criticize their failure to contribute to American politics. Indeed, both Adams
and Jefferson served as leaders of their respective parties, which in and of itself
indicates their contributions. Rather, the first two Vice Presidencies
demonstrate how the office was an ineffective means of wielding political
power. Without presidential backing or executive authority, the Vice President

61. Id.
62. Id. at 7.
63. See Senate Historical Office, Occasions When Vice Presidents Have Voted to Break Tie
Votes in the Senate (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
resources/pdf/VPTies.pdf.
64. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 7; see also Goldstein, supra note 13, at 519 (“[T]he office
was a sinecure, a prescription for frustration for the nation’s second citizen.”).
65. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 7.
66. 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 460 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, Little, Brown
& Co. 1856).
67. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 20–21.
68. Id. at 20.
69. See id. at 23.
70. See id. at 23–24.
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was no more than a “constitutional luxury,”71 even for men who had
substantial political clout.72 The formation of political parties during the 1790s
would reduce the Vice President’s political standing even further.73
2.

Political Weaknesses

As early as the 1790s, the politics of the nation were substantially different
from that desired by the delegates of the Constitutional Convention.74 In his
farewell address, President Washington discouraged the nation from creating
political parties.75 Dependence on political allies undermined the competition
among the branches that the Constitution had envisioned.76 Nonetheless, the
rising tide of political factions was inevitable. By 1796, parties had formed
presidential tickets, designating one candidate for President and another for
Vice President in the hopes of attracting more support from different regions of
the country.77 The party system exposed one of the weaknesses in the
Constitution and called for an amendment that left the Vice President as
nothing more than a vestigial remnant of an obsolete design.78
In the disastrous election of 1800, both Jefferson and Aaron Burr of the
Republican ticket received the same number of electoral votes.79 The Framers
had anticipated ties in the electorate and provided a remedy: “[I]f there be
more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,

71. Akhil Reed Amar & Brian C. Kalt, The Presidential Privilege Against Prosecution,
NEXUS, Spring 1997, at 11, 16; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 146.
72. Adams and Jefferson are not the only examples of strong leaders who failed to win
respect for the new office of the Vice Presidency. Consider, for example, John C. Calhoun, a
powerful congressman who had chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee during the War of 1812
and served as President Monroe’s Secretary of War. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 85–86. As
Vice President, Calhoun could not convince President John Quincy Adams to stay out of South
American affairs. See id. at 88. Even as a presiding officer during the “Golden Age of the
Senate,” Calhoun failed to win respect for the office. See id. at 84, 90 (“[I]t is not the duty, nor
the right, of the President of the Senate to call a member to order.” (quoting John Randolph)).
73. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6.
74. See id.
75. See George Washington, President of the United States, Farewell Address (Sept. 17,
1796), reprinted in 6 ANNALS OF CONG. app. 2869, 2873–74 (1796) (“[A]ll combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control,
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted authorities, are . . . of
fatal tendency.”).
76. See Steven M. Pyser, Recess Appointments to the Federal Judiciary: An
Unconstitutional Transformation of Senate Advice and Consent, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 61, 110
(2006); see also PADOVER, supra note 19, at 363 (“[C]onsidering the powers of the President and
those of the Senate, if a coalition should be established between these two branches, they will be
able to subvert the Constitution.” (attributing the comment to George Mason IV)).
77. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6.
78. See id.
79. Id.
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then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of
them for President . . . .”80 However, in the unlikely event of a tie,81 they had
planned for a resolution between adversaries, not allies.82 Even Aaron Burr
speculated that “[t]he Matter of V.P—is of very little comparative
Consequence,” since the election would probably end with Jefferson as
President and Adams as Vice President.83
Although Jefferson eventually won the dispute by a vote in the House of
Representatives, the country had come dangerously close to electing a man
whom the people never wanted to be President.84 Thus, an amendment which
provided a separate election for the Vice President and the President was
proposed.85 However, some feared that the Vice President would become an
office “worse than useless.”86 He would “not stand on such high ground in the
method proposed as he” did in the previous system of a double ballot.87
Consequently, they believed that the office would attract men of inferior
quality.88 There were even attempts to abolish the office entirely.89
Nonetheless, these attempts failed, and the Twelfth Amendment was ratified
on September 25, 1804.90 Caught between two competing branches without
any meaningful role in either, the office of the Vice President was struggling to
survive past its infancy.
3.

Succession Under Article II

If the primary purpose of the Vice Presidency—that of providing a means
to secure a President—posed problems, so did the Vice President’s other
purpose of providing a successor to the Commander in Chief. This problem
stemmed from the Framers’ ambiguous, if not careless, choice of words in
drafting the Constitution.91 Article II states: “In Case of the Removal of the

80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
81. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 364 (“It is probable that a majority of the votes will fall
on the same man; as each elector is to give two votes, more than one-fourth will give a majority.”
(attributing the comment to Gouverneur Morris)).
82. See Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 291, 312 (1999)
(“Presidents did not hand-pick their Vice-Presidents, who were more likely to be rivals than
partners.”).
83. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 35 (quoting Aaron Burr).
84. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Roger Griswold).
87. Id. (quoting Samuel Taggart).
88. See id. at 6–7 (“[T]he vice-presidential nomination was awarded as a consolation prize to
a defeated faction of a party. The credentials of some nominees were ludicrous.”).
89. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 6.
90. Id. at 6–7.
91. See WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 17 (“The convention, ironically, seemed much more
concerned with whether the vice president would serve as president of the Senate than with the
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President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge
the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President . . . .”92
But what does “the Same shall devolve” mean? If “the Same” refers to
“Powers and Duties,” then the Vice President would merely act as President
until a successor was chosen.93 If “the Same” refers to “Office,” then the Vice
President would in fact become President.94 Fortunately, the nation was not
forced to decide the meaning until 1841, when the sudden death of William
Henry Harrison launched Vice President John Tyler into the number one
spot.95 Tyler believed that the Constitution meant to confer upon him not only
the powers and duties, but also the title of President.96 When Harrison’s
Cabinet, among others, complained of his usurpation, Tyler responded, “I am
the President, and I shall be held responsible for my administration.”97
Amid the growing popularity of Tyler’s new found epithet, “His
Accidency,” Congress convened in a special meeting to resolve the issue.98
One Congressman suggested the Legislature address Tyler as “Vice President
now exercising the office of President.”99 Another envisioned a major struggle
if a President were only temporarily disabled and later sought to resume
power.100 However, Senator Calhoun reminded the Senate that this was not the
current dilemma, and Congress adopted a resolution recognizing Tyler’s
legitimate claim to the Presidency.101 This created “a new constitutional
understanding” of the office,102 which gave the Vice Presidency more
substance. Should the number one spot become vacant, the Vice President
would actually become President and not merely a temporary fix. Eventually,
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment incorporated the “Tyler precedent” into the
Constitution.103

infinitely more important matter of his succession to the presidency if fate or circumstance
dictated.”).
92. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
93. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 517. Professor Goldstein argues: “The drafts of the
pertinent provisions at the Constitutional Convention contained language that envisaged the Vice
President as a substitute who might occasionally exercise presidential powers and duties, not as
an officer who would become President.” Id.
94. Id.
95. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 142.
96. See id. at 143.
97. Id. (quoting John Tyler).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 144.
101. Id.
102. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 522.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (“In case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”).
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II. THE MODERN VICE PRESIDENCY
Despite the Vice President’s importance as successor to the President, until
midway through the twentieth century, the office was useful only as a means of
securing votes for presidential nominees. Political parties were far less
concerned with a vice presidential candidate’s qualifications to run the country
than with the state that he called home.104 But the needs of the nation shifted,
and the office adapted. Modern Vice Presidents enjoy broad international
reach and influence, often using the office as a “springboard to the
Presidency.”105 President Franklin Roosevelt realized the importance of the
Vice President when he stated: “While my heart and lungs are good and the
other organs functioning along okay . . . nothing in life is certain. . . . It’s
essential that the man who runs with me should be able to carry on.”106
But the path to the modern Vice Presidency was not a smooth ride.
Although the office has changed dramatically over the past two hundred years,
these changes came in several increments.107 No single person created the
modern Vice Presidency. It was a confluence of factors including global
events, constitutional amendments, and political forces that contributed to the
office’s current state.108
A.

Roosevelt Sets the Stage for the Modern Vice President

Recent Vice Presidents have shared a close political link with their
Commanders in Chief. But this was not always the case. Until the midtwentieth century, the convention, not the President, picked vice presidential
nominees.109 Party leaders generally looked for candidates who could balance
the ticket, satisfy a party faction, or bring in key votes.110 They paid little
attention to the pair’s personal and political compatibility. Often, the chosen
candidate reluctantly accepted the vice presidential nomination and approached

104. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 167 (attributing the fact that eight of the twenty-two
Vice Presidents during the nineteenth century called New York home to the state’s high number
of electoral votes).
105. Albert, supra note 2, at 812; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 11 (“Occupants of the
office in this century have almost invariably been considered presidential timber.”).
106. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 76 (alteration in original) (quoting Jim Farley’s account of
a conversation with Franklin D. Roosevelt).
107. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 8; see also Albert, supra note 2, at 812 (“There have
been four pivotal constitutional moments in vice presidential history.”).
108. See Albert, supra note 2, at 831. Vice presidential scholar Richard Albert divides the
evolution of the office along three axes: substantive functions, structural components, and
political purposes. Id.
109. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 47.
110. Id. at 48.
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the office with little enthusiasm.111 Additionally, presidential candidates were
not always fond of their running mates, and some even viewed their Vice
Presidents as political adversaries.112 Needless to say, the lack of a strong
bond between the two did not help advance the stature of the Vice Presidency.
But as the country found itself in the throes of depression and war, a new
sense of national urgency allowed President Franklin Roosevelt to transform
the Executive Branch and, necessarily, his relationship with the Vice
President.113 The Founding Fathers had envisioned that Congress would create
legislation, which the President would then enforce.114 Roosevelt reversed
these roles.115 He became actively involved in initiating and seeking
congressional support for legislation as part of his “New Deal.”116 The New
Deal opened the flood gates that had been holding back the power of the
Executive Branch.
Roosevelt needed help to control the enormous growth of government
activity.117 The Reorganization Act of 1939 allowed him to appoint assistants
within the Executive Branch.118 But Roosevelt also needed a liaison between
the White House and Capitol Hill, which he found in his Vice President, John
Nance Garner.119 Although initially a reluctant candidate for Vice President,
“Cactus Jack” immediately proved to be invaluable to the Roosevelt
Administration.120 His long legislative experience and desire to impact
Congressional decisions made him Roosevelt’s “political general,” leading the
charge on Capitol Hill.121 Realizing the importance of Garner’s sway over the
conservatives in Congress,122 Roosevelt made his Vice President an integral

111. Vice President Garret Hobart, for example, felt ambivalent about the honor of being
nominated. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 290. Others, like William Wheeler, even refused to
campaign. Id. at 245.
112. For example, President Ulysses S. Grant questioned the motivations of his Vice
President, Schuyler Colfax, when Colfax returned from an alleged retirement from politics. See
id. at 227–28.
113. David K. Nichols, Congressional Dominance and the Emergence of the Modern
Presidency: Was Congress Ever the First Branch of Government?, in SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 113, 113 (Bradford P. Wilson & Peter W. Schramm eds., 1994).
114. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 26–27.
115. Id. at 27.
116. See Nichols, supra note 113, at 113–14.
117. See JOHN HART, THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 26 (2d
ed. 1995).
118. Id. at 30.
119. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 388–89.
120. Id. at 385, 388.
121. Id. at 389.
122. Id. at 388 (“[T]he new vice president renewed political alliances with over twenty of his
former colleagues . . . . [S]ome of them had become the leaders of the party’s conservative wing
of southern and western Democrats, who held the key committee chairmanships.”).
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part of his Administration. He invited Garner to attend all cabinet meetings,123
and frequently phoned him to solicit opinions about proposals for
legislation.124 Garner often harbored personal opposition to some of the
President’s political agenda, but he dutifully convinced reluctant lawmakers to
support the President’s “good politics and good patriotism.”125
Vice President Garner, however, did not forget his conservative ties to
Congress. When Roosevelt needed support for his attempt to pack the
Supreme Court with more liberal justices, Garner showed his disapproval first
by holding his nose and gesturing with a “thumbs down” when the plan was
introduced, and then by going on “a vacation” with his wife when the Senate
was about to vote on the proposal.126 “This is a fine time to jump ship,” fumed
Roosevelt.127 The tension between the two reached a climax when Roosevelt
ran for an unprecedented third term. “No man should exercise the great
powers of the presidency too long,” stated Garner.128 It was evident that if
Roosevelt wanted another term, he would have to find a new running mate.129
Roosevelt’s experience with Garner convinced him that he needed to find a
Vice President with whom he shared the same ideologies, not just someone
who would do his bidding in Congress.130 He found such a partner in Henry
Wallace, and Roosevelt was adamant about having Wallace as his running
mate.131 When it was brought to Roosevelt’s attention that the Democratic
convention might not select Wallace for the vice presidential spot, he barked,
“Well damn it to hell . . . they will go for Wallace or I won’t run, and you can
jolly well tell them so.”132 Needless to say, Wallace was chosen.133
Roosevelt’s personal role in selecting his running mate over the wishes of
party leaders represented a huge shift in the vice presidential selection

123. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 71.
124. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 388.
125. Id. at 389.
126. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 73–74.
127. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 391.
128. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 75.
129. Id.
130. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 399.
131. See id.; WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 78 (“Henry’s not a mystic, he’s a philosopher, a
liberal philosopher, and I’m sure that he’ll be all right.” (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt)).
132. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 78 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt).
133. See id. at 80. Despite some dissention among party conservatives, who were concerned
about Roosevelt being a three-term President, he won in a landslide over his competitors for the
Democratic nomination. See id. at 76 (“The vote was FDR 946, Farley 72, Garner 61, Senator
Millard Tydings of Maryland 9, Secretary of State Cordell Hull 5.”).
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process.134 The personal compatibility of the ticket became a major factor135—
a trend that would continue to this day.136
B.

A New Executive Officer

Over the next several years, Vice Presidents assumed more executive
duties. With his eyes set on the war clouds over Europe, Roosevelt appointed
Wallace as the chairman of the Economic Defense Board.137 Additionally,
Wallace was the first Vice President to take an active role in foreign policy as
the President’s personal ambassador to countries throughout South America,
Europe, and Asia.138 Vice President Alben Barkley, under President Harry
Truman,139 was given an ex officio membership to the National Security
council.140
As they took on more executive functions, Vice Presidents spent less time
in Congress.141 With the array of new functions President Dwight D.
Eisenhower had given him, it is no wonder that Vice President Richard Nixon
found his constitutional role as presiding officer of the Senate dull.142
Eisenhower gave Nixon both domestic and foreign projects,143 earning him a
role as the President’s advisor in both policy and politics.144 As Eisenhower’s
personal ambassador, Nixon traveled through fifty-four countries and met with
forty-five heads of state during his eight years as Vice President.145 On the
home front, Eisenhower used Nixon’s political savvy to broker deals with
powerful senators who were trying to undermine the Administration.146
Despite his active role in Eisenhower’s Administration, Nixon was careful not
to usurp power when the President suffered a coronary attack.147 Nixon’s

134. See id. at 81.
135. Id.
136. See Stephen Goode, Quayle Predicts Dole Will Pick a Governor, INSIGHT, Aug. 28,
1995, at 12, 13 (“There ‘must be a comfort level between the president and the vice president’
that is genuine.” (quoting Dan Quayle)).
137. WITCOVER, supra note 34, at 81.
138. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 403.
139. See Robert H. Ferrell, Seasoned Politicians: Harry S. Truman and Alben W. Barkley as
Vice Presidents, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 63, 63 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997).
140. Albert, supra note 2, at 833.
141. Barkley was the last Vice President to preside regularly over the Senate. HATFIELD,
supra note 58, at 427.
142. Id. at 442.
143. Albert, supra note 2, at 833.
144. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 438.
145. Id. at 442.
146. Id. at 438–39 (illustrating the methods Nixon used in handling the Bricker Amendment
and the “McCarthy problem”).
147. Id. at 443.
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ability “to provide leadership without appearing to lead” during this time was
praised by even his sharpest critics.148
C. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Forges a New Vision of the Office
President Eisenhower’s brush with death and President John F. Kennedy’s
assassination once again brought the issue of succession to the forefront of
national concern.149 The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was proposed to provide a
smooth transition of power in the event of a presidential vacancy—whether by
death, resignation, removal, or disability.150 Unlike the Framers of the original
Constitution, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had the advantage
of hindsight.151 They witnessed the failures of the original design for the Vice
Presidency, and this experience put them in a much better position to fix the
problems.152 Consequently, their perception of the office was far different
from that of the Founding Fathers.153
First, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment saw the Vice President
as the true successor to the President rather than a mere temporary
replacement.154 Section 1 of the Amendment confirms the Tyler precedent,155
stating: “In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or
resignation, the Vice President shall become President.”156 This simply makes
constitutional in text what was “constitutional in fact.”157 Before the adoption
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, every President who died in office was

148. Id. (quoting Richard Nixon).
149. See Richard M. Nixon, We Need a Vice President Now, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan.
1, 1964, reprinted in Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of the Vice President:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 238 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (“It is a tragic fact that it took a
terrible crime in Dallas to remind us of a serious defect in our constitutional process. The murder
of our President has forced us to reassess our law of succession and the office of the Vice
President.”).
150. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 202.
151. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 22 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating,
Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (“The limits of human foresight can
perhaps explain why the Founding Fathers left the glaring omissions and silences on Presidential
inability we perceive today in article II of the Constitution.”).
152. See id. (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating, Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments) (“Having had no operating experience, so to speak, under the novel institution of
the Presidency which they were creating, it may well be that those wise statesmen counted upon
the trial-and-error process of experience to galvanize their descendants into finally devising an
adequate and lasting solution.”).
153. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 540.
154. Id. at 537.
155. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
APPLICATIONS 193 (2d ed. 1992).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1 (emphasis added).
157. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 527.
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succeeded by his Vice President under the Tyler precedent.158 Nonetheless, the
Amendment was an important step toward securing the validity of the office
and ensuring the Vice President’s status as the President’s rightful heir.
Second, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment saw the Vice
Presidency as a necessary institution within the government.159 Their view of
its importance is underscored by the mere fact that Section 2 of the
Amendment provides a means of succession to the Vice Presidency160—
something the Framers at the 1787 Convention did not even consider during
their debates.161 The Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had witnessed
the growth of the office during the twentieth century, and they realized that it
was indispensable.162 Senator Bayh referred to it as “the second most
important office in the land,” and he emphasized its “resurgence and
redevelopment” during the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.163
Senator Fong echoed the sentiments of the nation by proclaiming that “[n]o
one in America today doubts that the Vice-Presidency is an office of
paramount importance.”164 Former Vice President Richard Nixon even
suggested that the office should continue to expand and assume greater
responsibilities.165 Because the office had received more power from the Chief
Executive, it was “no longer the ornamental office that it once was.”166
Finally, the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment spoke of the Vice
President increasingly as a member of the Executive Branch.167 While the

158. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 10 (listing vice presidential successors to the
President).
159. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S.
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (“Why have a Vice President? Hasn’t this office
been the object of sharp satire since the Constitutional Convention created it as an
afterthought? . . . Maybe so—once upon a time. But no more—not in 20th century America.”).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 2; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 1
(statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments) (stating
that the best way to preserve stability in the event that both a President and Vice President die
within the same four year term is to “make certain that the Nation always has a Vice President as
well as a President”).
161. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 526.
162. See FEERICK, supra note 155, at 33.
163. 110 CONG. REC. 22,986 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
164. Id. at 22,993 (statement of Sen. Fong).
165. See Nixon, supra note 149, at 238 (“Clearly there can be no reversal of this trend toward
greater duties and responsibilities for the Vice President.”).
166. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 52 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
167. Goldstein, supra note 13, at 531. In fact, Senator Keating proposed that there be two
Vice Presidents, one who discharged executive duties and another who discharged legislative
duties. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 26–27 (statement of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating,
Member, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments). This idea was rejected by others who
felt that the Vice President should continue to grow in stature and that spreading the duties too
thin would undermine this advancement. See id. at 5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S.
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Founding Fathers only spoke of a “close intimacy,”168 there is no shortage of
quotes from the debates over the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that indicate the
Framers’ attitude toward the relationship between the Chief Executive and the
Vice President. In his opening statement before the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments, Senator Bayh noted:
The Vice President is today an integral part of Cabinet meetings. Modern-day
Presidents seek the advice and counsel of their Vice Presidents. The Vice
President is a statutory member of the National Security Council. He is
Chairman of the President’s Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
169
He is Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council.

Senator Jacob K. Javits would later add that the Vice President is “a worldwide
traveler for American goodwill” who “must be kept abreast of the critically
important knowledge and basis for decision which inhere in the Presidency.”170
Representative Byron G. Rogers believed the Vice President worked more
closely with the President than did any other cabinet member.171 Attorney
General Nicholas Katzenbach even referred to the Vice Presidency as a “high
command of the executive branch of the Government.”172 The point was clear
to the Framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: by 1967 the Vice President
had “become a full-fledged, working member of the executive branch.”173
D. Moving the Vice Presidency to the Executive Branch
The conception of this new Vice President, found within the vision of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, soon proved to be a reality. Even as the
Amendment was being drafted, Vice President Hubert Humphrey was taking
the office to a new level of activism “as the busiest vice president in history
during his first year in office.”174 President Johnson used Humphrey much like

Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments); Nixon, supra note 149, at 237. Moreover, the
legislative Vice President would have practically no meaningful post as only the President of the
Senate, and the office would attract men of inferior political stature. See 1964 Senate Hearings,
supra note 149, at 5 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments).
168. See PADOVER, supra note 19, at 391 (attributing the comment to Elbridge Gerry).
169. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 149, at 2 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh, Chairman, S.
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments).
170. Id. at 52 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
171. Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 159–
60 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep. Byron G. Rogers, Member, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary).
172. Id. at 108 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach, U.S. Att’y Gen.).
173. See 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
174. ALBERT EISELE, ALMOST TO THE PRESIDENCY: A BIOGRAPHY OF TWO AMERICAN
POLITICIANS 235 (1972).
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Roosevelt used Garner in persuading Congress to adopt his proposals.175 But it
was clear that Humphrey was acting on behalf of Johnson and not as an
independent legislative officer.176 Vice President Spiro Agnew also quickly
discovered that he did not belong in the Senate when Senator Len Jordan
scolded, “You can’t tell me how to vote!” sending Agnew back to try his luck
in the White House. 177 Although Vice President Dan Quayle initially tried to
take an active role in the Senate, he too found himself becoming more a part of
the Executive than the Legislative Branch.178
Soon after the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Vice
President became the President’s advisor in virtually all key decisions. 179
Walter Mondale lobbied President Carter for a central role in his
Administration.180 In response, Carter invited his Vice President to every
meeting that he scheduled, allowing Mondale to choose those he wanted to
attend.181 The two also shared a weekly luncheon to exchange ideas.182 To
show that Mondale’s opinion mattered, Carter moved the Vice President’s
office into the West Wing for easy and regular access—a significant step both
practically and symbolically, continuing to this day.183 Mondale later
explained, “[W]e entered our offices understanding—perhaps for the first time
in the history of those offices—that each of us could do a better job if we
maintained the trust of the other.”184
That view of the relationship between the President and Vice President has
persisted. Despite President Ronald Reagan’s initial misgivings about Vice
President George Herbert Walker Bush, the two had weekly luncheons so that
Reagan could draw from Bush’s broad experience in politics and diplomacy.185
When Bush became President in his own right, he invited Quayle “to become
fully informed about every aspect of the presidency.”186 President Clinton and

175. See HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 469; supra text accompanying notes 113–25.
176. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 469.
177. ALLEN DRURY, COURAGE AND HESITATION 98–100 (1971).
178. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 549 (“From the viewpoint of the Executive Branch, I found
the Senate disorganized and unmanageable.” (quoting Dan Qualye)).
179. Robert A. Rankin, Editorial, Gore Expands Role of the Vice Presidency, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 5, 1993, at 1M (stating that the Mondale Vice Presidency “set the model for the
modern vice presidency as the president’s senior advisor on virtually everything”).
180. Steven Thomma, Mondale Advises Quayle to Fight for Office’s Stature, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 8, 1988, at 30A (“Mondale [still possesses] a copy of a memo he wrote 12 years ago to
Jimmy Carter, then the president-elect, arguing for a more activist vice presidency.”).
181. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 522.
182. Id.
183. Albert, supra note 2, at 834.
184. PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE-PRESIDENTIAL POWER: ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE
HOUSE 213 (1984) (quoting Walter Mondale).
185. HATFIELD, supra note 58, at 535–36.
186. Id. at 549.
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Vice President Al Gore even presented themselves as a type of co-presidency
in their bid for the White House,187 where Gore quickly took an active role in
environmental issues188 and foreign policy.189 Indeed, the Vice Presidency has
come a long way from being “constitutionally confined to legislative
functions.”190 It is in the context of the modern Vice President under the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment that we must address the question of where Cheney
belongs between the Executive and Legislative Branches.
III. CHENEY’S VICE PRESIDENCY
In an interview with Mark Knoller of CBS Radio, Vice President Cheney
stated that “the Vice President is kind of a unique creature . . . in that you’ve
got a foot in both branches.”191 When pressed to state the branch to which he
believes he principally belongs, Cheney responded, “Well, I suppose you could
argue it either way. The fact is I do work in both branches. Under the
Constitution, I’m assigned responsibilities in the Legislative Branch. Then the
President obviously gives me responsibilities in the Executive Branch. And I
perform both those functions . . . .”192 However, actions speak louder than
words. Cheney has represented himself as a member of the Executive Branch
in three ways: functionally, politically, and constitutionally.
A.

Cheney as the Chief of Staff

From the moment he took office, one of Cheney’s major concerns was
giving the Vice Presidency more power.193 When former Vice President Dan

187. See Chris Reidy, Spittin’ Image: Gore Is Remaking the Vice Presidency, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 29, 1993, at 67 (“While Bill Clinton and Al Gore have yet to develop the sort of
copresidency they seemed to hint at during the 1992 campaign, the new vice president
nevertheless looms large as a potentially influential player in the administration.”); see also
Michael Nelson, Vice President’s Expectations Are Probably Too High, TIMES UNION (Albany),
Jan. 17, 1993, at E1 (“Clinton . . . publicly proclaimed before the election that there would be a
‘full partnership’ in the Clinton administration between him and Gore.”).
188. See Jodi Enda, For Gore, Homework and Persistence Are Keys, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov.
5, 2000, at D3 (“Less than five months after the clean-air decision, Gore did something that took
even high-ranking White House aides by surprise. As negotiations for an international treaty
intended to reduce global warming stood on the brink of collapse during a conference in Japan,
the vice president hopped on a plane to revive them.”).
189. See Marianne Means, Op-Ed, Gore Closest Thing to Co-President Constitution Allows,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23, 1993, at A8 (“In one of the fastest transformations in
history, Vice President Al Gore has suddenly become our designated heavy hitter in foreign
policy, outdoing President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher.”).
190. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry (May 13, 1797), in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 10, at 120.
191. Cheney Interview, supra note 24.
192. Id.
193. See A Strong Push, supra note 15.
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Quayle told him of the mundane duties of the office, Cheney replied with a
smile, “I have a different understanding with the president.”194 His
understanding is “that the vice president should be the chief of staff in effect,
that everything should run through his office.”195 Having served as President
Ford’s Chief of Staff, Cheney realized the potential power of the Vice
President, if given the proper patron.196 President Bush has been more than
willing to allow his Vice President to hammer out the finer details of executive
projects.197 As Washington Post journalist Barton Gellman put it, “He doesn’t
just advise, he operates.”198
In fulfilling his constitutional responsibilities, Vice President Cheney has
cast a tie-breaking vote in the Senate only eight times during his two term
tenure.199 In contrast, his executive responsibilities are practically limitless,
impacting “whatever area [he] feels he wants to be active in.”200 He has taken
on “the iron issues” such as the economy, national security, and energy
concerns, and he has become the “go-to guy on the Hill,” where he presses
through President Bush’s legislative proposals.201 Even Cheney himself
acknowledges that he spends “more time on executive matters than legislative
matters.”202 While he technically has responsibilities in the Senate, he
predominantly focuses on his responsibilities in the White House.203
Cheney’s influence in the Executive Branch is unlike that of any of his
predecessors. While he has no direct constitutional authority in the Executive
Branch, Cheney receives great deference from Bush’s advisors.204 Attorney
General John D. Ashcroft once observed, “When [Cheney] talked, everybody
would listen.”205 Similarly, journalist Barton Gellman noted that at meetings
without the President, Cheney is “the only one everyone stands up for when he

194. Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: A Different
Understanding with the President, WASH. POST, June 24, 2007, at A1 [hereinafter A Different
Understanding].
195. A Strong Push, supra note 15 (quoting John O. Marsh Jr., a former Army secretary and
longtime friend of Cheney).
196. A Different Understanding, supra note 194.
197. See A Strong Push, supra note 15.
198. Lateline: Cheney Still Has Influence, Expert Says (Australian Broadcasting Corp.
television broadcast June 28, 2007) [hereinafter Cheney Still Has Influence].
199. See Senate Historical Office, supra note 63.
200. A Different Understanding, supra note 194 (quoting Joshua B. Bolten, White House
Chief of Staff).
201. Id. (quoting Mary Matalin, counselor to the Vice President).
202. Cheney Interview, supra note 24.
203. See A Different Understanding, supra note 194.
204. See id.
205. Barton Gellman & Jo Becker, Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency: The Unseen Path to
Cruelty, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at A1 (quoting John D. Ashcroft).
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walks into the room.”206 Crossing Cheney has even cost some officials their
jobs—a lesson learned all too well by Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill after
he opposed Cheney on his proposal to cut taxes.207
Cheney is usually the last person to speak to Bush before he makes final
decisions.208 But Cheney also has a substantial say in what the President hears
first. Whereas previous Vice Presidents enjoyed a standing invitation to join
the President during cabinet meetings, Cheney has intervened at the cabinet
and sub-cabinet levels, even in the President’s absence.209 At these meetings
he acts not only as a sounding board, but also as a filter, rejecting options that
he deems infeasible even before they reach the President’s doorstep.210
Occasionally, Cheney is the only person to talk to Bush before he makes a
decision. Two months after the attacks on September 11, 2001, Cheney
convinced Bush over the course of their weekly luncheon to sign an executive
order that denied foreign terrorism suspects access to any court hearing.211
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice were reportedly enraged to discover that they had not been consulted on
such a major decision that affected both foreign policy and national security.212
Similarly, Attorney General John Ashcroft felt that as the President’s senior
law enforcement officer, in charge of terrorism prosecutions nationwide, he
should have had some input before the order was signed.213 John C. Yoo, a
deputy chief of the Office of Legal Counsel, argued that “[t]he issue we dealt
with was: Can the president do it constitutionally? . . . [The State Department]
wouldn’t have views on that.”214 But the Vice President did, and apparently he
was the only high ranking official to voice his opinion to the President.215
In other matters, it would seem that Cheney bypasses the President
altogether. When the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
intelligence committees were summoned to the White House for their first
briefing on government eavesdropping in the wake of 9/11, they were led
immediately to the Vice President’s office.216 Under previous Presidents,
206. Cheney Still Has Influence, supra note 198.
207. A Strong Push, supra note 15.
208. Id.
209. A Different Understanding, supra note 194.
210. A Strong Push, supra note 15 (“Perhaps more important than Cheney’s influence in
pushing policies is his power to stop them before they reach the Oval Office.”).
211. Eugene Robinson, ‘Angler’ for Power, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A21.
212. A Different Understanding, supra note 194.
213. Id.
214. Id. (noting that the State Department “hosts the archives of the Geneva Conventions and
the government’s leading experts on the law of war”).
215. Id. (“Almost no one else had seen the [proposal].”).
216. A Different Understanding, supra note 194 (noting that Bush told a member of the
intelligence committee that “the vice president should be your point of contact in the White
House,” as Cheney “has the portfolio for intelligence activities”).
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conversations of such gravity would at least have involved the Commander in
Chief.217 Similarly, Cheney has made his office a “hub of tax policy.”218 He
met with Federal Reserve Chairman Allen Greenspan more often than
Greenspan met with President Bush.219 R. Glenn Hubbard, Bush’s former
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers stated, “I’d have conversations
with [Cheney] that were at a level of detail that those with the president were
not.”220
B.

What the People Wanted

Cheney has represented himself as a member of the Executive Branch
politically in two ways.
First, he adds “gravitas” to the Bush
Administration.221 President Bush did not select Dick Cheney as his running
mate to win Wyoming’s three electoral votes.222 As Bush has explained, “I
picked him because he is without a doubt fully capable of being president of
the United States.”223 But it is doubtful that Americans were considering
Cheney’s presidential qualifications when they voted for Bush.224 The people
voted for the Bush/Cheney ticket because they saw in Cheney what was
needed in Bush to run the White House: experience. Bush has even
acknowledged this: “I’m basically a media creation. I’ve never done anything.
I’ve worked for my dad. I worked in the oil business. But that’s not the kind
of profile you have to have to get elected to public office.”225 Voters would
not be happy with a “media creation” running the country. They needed and
expected Cheney to be the President’s right hand man in the White House.
Pundits promised voters that Cheney would be “a prime minister with helping
to set up the White House, setting an agenda and dealing with Congress.”226
Indeed, at the Republican National Convention in 2000, Cheney stated, “I am
glad to be back in the arena,” referring not to the upcoming campaign, but to
the White House itself.227
217. Id.
218. A Strong Push, supra note 15.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Jonathon Karl, Cheney’s Impressive Resume Commands Attention, CNN, July 23, 2000,
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/07/23/cheney.profile/index.html.
222. JOHN NICHOLS, DICK: THE MAN WHO IS PRESIDENT 172 (2004) (quoting George W.
Bush).
223. Id.
224. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 133 (noting that “few voters weigh heavily the
attributes of competing vice-presidential candidates” and that the “primary purpose of presidential
elections is to pick a President, not a contingent leader”).
225. NICHOLS, supra note 222, at 165 (quoting George W. Bush).
226. Karl, supra note 221.
227. Richard Cheney, Republican Vice-Presidential Candidate, Acceptance Speech at 2000
Republican National Convention (Aug. 2, 2000) (transcript available at http://query.nytimes.com/
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Second, Cheney answers to only one person: the President.228 In this way,
he is politically like a member of the President’s staff. Members of the
Legislature answer directly to the people who elect them and must constantly
worry about how they appear to the public. Cheney, however, seems to care
little about how he is perceived by the public or portrayed by the media.229
Having no presidential aspirations of his own,230 approval ratings in the teens
do not seem to affect Cheney’s decision making.231 Certainly, Cheney was
elected in the manner prescribed by Article II and the Twelfth Amendment.
But, as Professor Goldstein has pointed out, “Even though some citizens are
influenced by the vice-presidential candidates it would be inaccurate to
conclude that the Vice President is really elected.”232 Rather, he was
effectively appointed by Bush, following the tradition of approval by a
relatively passive convention.233
C. The Supreme Court Determines Cheney Is Part of the Executive Branch
By all accounts Cheney is a secretive man,234 and he has refused to turn
over documents to outside officials on more than one occasion.235 After Bush
gst/fullpage.html?res=9B04E0D8163CF930A3575BC0A9669C8B63&n=Top/Reference/Times%
20Topics/Subjects/E/Elections).
228. It is worth noting here that Vice President Cheney does not always get his way. See A
Different Understanding, supra note 194 (“Bush has set his own course, not always in directions
Cheney preferred.”). Cheney has suffered several domestic policy defeats, but word of them
usually does not reach the public. See A Strong Push, supra note 15.
229. Kevin Vance, Behind-the-Scenes Cheney: Biography Links Leadership Style to Early
Work on Hill, WASH. TIMES, July 31, 2007, at A2 (noting that Cheney has even joked, “Am I the
evil genius in the corner that nobody ever sees come out of his hole? . . . It’s a nice way to
operate, actually”). This is in sharp contrast to other Vice Presidents, such as Richard Nixon,
who used his public image to increase the significance of the Vice Presidency. See supra text
accompanying notes 141–48.
230. Cheney Still Has Influence, supra note 198.
231. See A Different Understanding, supra note 194.
232. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 14, at 132; see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., On the
Presidential Succession, 89 POL. SCI. Q. 475, 483–84 (1974) (“No one votes for a Vice President
per se. He is a part of a package deal . . . .”).
233. See Friedman, supra note 22, at 1705 (“A party’s choice of its candidate for vicepresident is rarely the result of any true democratic process; rather, it is almost always a matter of
the presidential nominee’s discretion, quickly ratified by a passive convention.”).
234. See, e.g., Cheney Still Has Influence, supra note 198 (“Because [Cheney is] so secretive
and stealthy you don’t hear about it when he advises one course and then takes another.”); see
also A Different Understanding, supra 194 (“Stealth is among Cheney’s most effective tools.
Man-size Mosler safes . . . store the workaday business of the office of the vice president. . . .
Across the board, the vice president’s office goes to unusual lengths to avoid transparency.”).
235. See Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, Fact
Sheet: The Vice President’s Efforts to Avoid Oversight and Accountability, http://over
sight.house.gov/documents/20070621095118.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2008) (listing Cheney’s
“repeated efforts to shield the activities of his office from public scrutiny”).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

A REALISTIC LOOK AT THE VICE PRESIDENCY

305

made Cheney Chairman of the National Energy Policy Development Group in
2001, the Government Accountability Office asked Cheney to identify the
industry officials with whom his group had met.236 Cheney refused to release
their names, stating: “[T]his request that in fact we’re suppose[d] to provide
[Congress] with this information with respect to . . . those meetings in the
Executive Branch between the Vice President and other individuals strikes me
as—as inappropriate . . . .”237 Executive power, he argued, should remain free
from the interference of other branches.238
The resulting Supreme Court case239 had the potential to answer key
questions regarding the Vice President’s role in the Executive Branch. Cheney
argued that his communications with the President were protected by the
principle of separation of powers.240 Anticipating that his opponents would
capitalize on the dual nature of the Vice Presidency, Cheney had stated in a
letter to Congress, “[W]hile the Vice President is the President of the Senate,
he also has executive duties and responsibilities in support of the President, as
the Congress has by law recognized.”241 Additionally, Cheney emphasized his
role in the Executive Branch as a close confidant to the President.242 Cheney
even relied on the Recommendations Clause and the Opinion Clause, two
constitutional provisions strictly limited to Article II and the Executive Branch,
in order to protect his discussions with the President.243

236. See id.
237. Nightline: A Conversation with Dick Cheney (ABC television broadcast July 25, 2001).
238. Brief for the Petitioners at 30–31, Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No.
03-475).
239. Cheney, 542 U.S. 367.
240. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 12 (“[T]he legislative power and judicial
power cannot be utilized to require the Vice President to disclose to private litigants the substance
or the details of the process by which a President obtains information and advice from the Vice
President, heads of departments and agencies, and assistants to the President in the exercise of
powers committed exclusively to the President by the Constitution . . . .”).
241. Letter from Richard Cheney to the House of Representatives and the Senate (Aug. 2,
2001), reprinted in 147 CONG. REC. S10,447 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2001).
242. See Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 12; see also id. at 25–26 (arguing that the
Vice President is in fact acting on behalf of the President, and therefore, the same considerations
that would preclude action against the President would preclude action against the Vice
President).
243. Id. at 37. Despite popular belief, Cheney never officially argued that he was entitled to
executive privilege. See e.g., Robinson, supra note 211 (“Didn’t Cheney claim executive
privilege as his reason for keeping secret the process he followed in developing the
administration’s energy policy . . . ?”). In fact, the Court in Cheney v. United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that Cheney did not have to assert executive privilege to
prevent Congress’s broad discovery requests in a civil suit. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 388. Cheney
believed that the separation of powers doctrine was sufficient protection for his communications
with the President. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 238, at 31 (“Congress cannot ‘inquire
into matters which are within the exclusive province’ of the Executive . . . . This is true,
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The Supreme Court agreed with Cheney, using language that repeatedly
“lump[ed] the vice presidency together with the presidency.”244 The Court
determined, “These separation-of-powers considerations should inform a court
of appeals’ evaluation [of a case] involving the President or the Vice
President.”245 Elsewhere the Court referred to Cheney as a person who is in
the “closest operational proximity to the President.”246 The Court also
explicitly rejected any argument based on cases that did not involve senior
members of the Executive Branch as “altogether misplaced.”247 “Were the
Vice President not a party in the case,” the Court admitted, “the argument . . .
might present different considerations.”248 Cheney won his case: in the eyes of
the Supreme Court, Vice Presidents are members of the Executive Branch.
CONCLUSION
Vice President Cheney’s argument that he is not an “entity within the
executive branch” fails for several reasons. First, Cheney’s reliance on the
Founders’ original intentions for the office has been superseded by the new
wisdom of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. While the Founders may have
originally believed that the primary duties of the Vice President—as President
of the Senate—were legislative, their reasons for creating the office were
purely executive. The main purpose of the Vice President was to ensure that
the proper President would be elected. The secondary purpose was to provide
for a means of succession. The methods prescribed in the original Constitution
to meet these objectives were flawed and led to major problems for a young
democracy. With the advantage of hindsight, the Twelfth Amendment
corrected the mode of election, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment corrected the
mode of succession. Although they were exceedingly wise, the Founding
Fathers were anything but clairvoyant. Cheney is truly mistaken if he believes

moreover, without regard to the assertion of a claim of Executive privilege.” (quoting Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959)). Perhaps Cheney did not want to recall Nixon’s
infamous use of privilege, or perhaps he did not want to open a debate about whether he would be
able to assert privilege on his own behalf (thus directly bringing into question whether he
belonged in the Executive Branch). See Jeffrey P. Carlin, Note, Walker v. Cheney: Politics,
Posturing, and Executive Privilege, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 269 (2002). Nonetheless, the Court
failed “to explain how, or even why, executive privilege applies to the peculiar office of the vice
presidency.” Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision—A Missed Chance to Straighten Out
Some Muddled Issues, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2003–2004, at 185, 200 (Mark K.
Moller ed., 2004).
244. Amar, supra note 243, at 200.
245. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382.
246. Id. at 381.
247. Id. at 385.
248. Id. at 381.
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that we should rely on the Founding Fathers’ original vision of the Vice
Presidency in light of all the problems it created.
Second, Cheney’s argument fails to account for the transformation of the
office, especially over the past century. To meet the growing needs of a strong
Executive, the Vice Presidency has migrated into the Executive Branch. Vice
Presidents have steadily assumed a greater role as presidential advisors,
ambassadors, and confidants. They have chaired significant executive posts
and regularly attended presidential cabinet meetings where they have
influenced key policy decisions. With an office physically located in the West
Wing, Vice President Cheney has spent less time on Capitol Hill and more
time in the White House at the President’s disposal. As Jon Stewart put it,
“[Saying that Cheney is part of the Legislative Branch is] like the Harlem
Globetrotters saying they were part of Scooby and the Gang, even though they
only showed up once at a haunted amusement park and once on some
Christmas special that doesn’t even count!”249
Finally, Cheney’s argument fails because he himself successfully
convinced the Supreme Court that the Vice President is a member of the
Executive Branch. As the supreme interpreters of the Constitution, the Court
has held that an overbroad discovery request made by the Legislative Branch
in a civil suit against the Vice President violates the principle of separation of
powers.250 Because there are only three branches of government, and the Vice
President is obviously not in the Judicial Branch, he necessarily belongs in the
Executive Branch. As one reporter observed, “He can’t possibly argue that
he’s part of neither branch.”251 If Cheney truly believed that he were not a part
of the Executive Branch, then he would have to assume that the Court was
incorrect in its assessment of his own argument that he is an executive official.
Thus, the current office of the Vice President is firmly rooted within the
Executive Branch, despite Cheney’s best arguments to the contrary. While
Cheney has been criticized by some as being one of the most reprehensible
political figures in the history of the nation,252 he deserves some credit for
expanding the office of the Vice Presidency—an institution which has become
an increasingly vital part of the government over the past one hundred years.
Credit also belongs to President George W. Bush, whose willingness to
delegate authority has given Cheney a proper home in the White House. But
the majority of credit belongs to Cheney’s predecessors during the last century,

249. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, supra note 8.
250. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391–92.
251. Dana Milbank, The Cheese Stands Alone, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A2 (quoting
Keith Koffler of Congress Daily) (internal quotation marks omitted).
252. See, e.g., John Mashek, Cheney: The Worst Ever, on A Capital View, http://www.us
news.com/blogs/mashek/2007/6/11/cheney-the-worst-ever.html (June 11, 2007, 14:59 EST).
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whose vision of the Vice Presidency provided Cheney with the tools he needed
to assume unprecedented powers as an entity within the Executive Branch.
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